

# Flake or Fox?

Libya's Kaddafi is a dangerous man, but he seems to know what he's doing

## How His Mind Works

Egypt's Anwar Sadat once claimed that Kaddafi was "100 percent sick and possessed of the demon." Another old foe, former Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiry, diagnosed him as "a split personality—both evil." Even his admirers concede that Kaddafi is moody, hot tempered and unpredictable. An administration official argues that Kaddafi "displays behavior typical of many sociopaths or psychopaths—extremely warm one moment, then hostile and cold the next." Unproven but persistent rumors speak of secret treatments in a Swiss sanitarium years ago. But there is no solid clinical evidence on which to base a judgment about Kaddafi's mental health, which forces analysts to rely on their own instincts. Former CIA Director Richard Helms, who has extensive experience in the Middle East, concludes that "Kaddafi is in some respects crazy like a fox. His various moves, even though seemingly outlandish, appear to have some strategic

or tactical motive behind them. I think he's peculiar, quixotic, eccentric. But I don't think he's crazy by any means."

In large part, Kaddafi is a product of Bedouin culture. He was born 43 years ago, the son of a shepherd who lived in a goatskin tent in northern Libya, a region steeped in poverty despite the oil that enriched a few under the Libyan monarchy. Kaddafi took to the gospel of revolution at an early age, modeling himself at various times on Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and China's Mao Tse-tung, among others. He learned a little English at a school in Tripoli and studied briefly in England, where he felt like an outsider, he says now. Back in Libya, he joined the Army, married a former nurse and eventually fathered seven children. In 1969 Kaddafi and a small group of fellow officers overthrew King Idris and steered

Libya on to a radically new course.

Reflecting his nomadic tribal background, Kaddafi instinctively opposes the rich and powerful and resists any form of political structure and the impediments that go with it. Under his leadership, Libya has been transformed into *al Jamahiriyah*—"the state of the masses." The oil wealth has been widely redistributed. Kaddafi's political, social and economic ideas,

some of them distinctly half-baked, are spelled out in the three slim volumes of his Green Book, self-consciously modeled on Mao's Little Red Book. "No representation in lieu of the people" is its overriding principle—the idea that everyone should share in government, town-meeting style. In practice, however, the Green Book concedes that any society will be ruled by the strong—in this case, Kaddafi. The colonel

holds no formal job in the state; he is simply *al Qaid*, The Leader.

"Kaddafi's foremost ambition is to dominate and unite the Arab world," says a white paper released by the State Department last week. "He frequently compares himself to Garibaldi or Bismarck and has justified his use of violence and terrorism against moderate Arab regimes as necessary to achieve Arab unity." Kaddafi is also

an egotist and a crybaby who sulks or throws tantrums when he doesn't get what he wants. He can act prudently and will even back down when he has to. But a study by the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies predicted a year ago that Kaddafi will never change. "We concluded that there is a zero probability that Kaddafi will abandon his dream of uniting the Arab world under his leadership

and of humiliating the United States," says an administration official. "and an equally remote chance that he will abandon terrorism as his principal weapon."

RUSSELL WATSON with JOHN WALCOTT,  
KIM WILLENSON and ZOFIA SMARDZ  
in Washington. MICHAEL A. LERNER in Tripoli.  
THEODORE STANGER in Rome and bureau reports

# SECRET AGENT MAN

## NO WONDER MILES COPELAND'S KIDS FORMED THE POLICE

DOUBLE AGENTS SELLING SECRETS TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS; defectors running amok in the streets of Washington; allies betraying allies — these days spies are out of the shadows and on the spot. Yet espionage isn't what it once was, and at least one Cold War vet fondly remembers overthrowing unfriendly governments, planning assassinations and performing dirty tricks. Most of all, retired CIA officer Miles Copeland (whose brood of rock & roll overachievers includes oldest son Miles Copeland III, manager of the Police and solo Song; Ian, founder of the music booking agency FBI; and youngest son Stewart, drummer first for Curved Air and later for the Police) yearns for the good old days when secret agents kept their secrets secret — from the government and especially from the press.

Born in Birmingham, Alabama, Copeland joined the U.S. Army in 1940. Assigned to the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), he transferred in 1942 to the new Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the first U.S. secret intelligence agency. After the war, Copeland was

**BY ROBERT ERINGER**

station chief in Damascus, "putting Syria," as he recalls, "on the path to democracy by starting a military dictatorship." For this achievement, he was awarded a presidential citation. Copeland became a member of the Central Intelligence Agency when it was founded in 1947; he was appointed chief of the agency's Political Action Staff, the dirty-tricks department, in 1951. "Nobody," he says, "knows more about changing governments, by force or otherwise, than me."

Copeland left government service in 1957 to form his own "private CIA," which he claims became the largest private security service operating in Africa and the Middle East. Today the seventy-two-year-old Copeland and his wife, Lorraine, a well-known British archaeologist, live in a stone cottage in the tranquil hamlet of Aston Rowant, near Oxford, in England.

The White House has given the CIA part of the job of handling terrorism. What do you think they will do that is different from what has already been done?

You know, you're opening a real can of worms here. The difference between the CIA's counterterrorism experts and this new kind that's been proliferating all over the place is that the CIA has operators who know the terrorists, who've actually talked to a few, who've even lived with them, or who, like myself, have actually been terrorists. We understand the enemy, while these instant experts who've been advising the White House have never in their lives laid eyes on a terrorist, and they think of them as common criminals. Maybe they are, and maybe they aren't, but where these recent "experts" are wrong is that they assume they are criminals simply because they are judging them as though they are Americans, brought up on American ideas of what's right and what's wrong. They are making moral

judgments that aren't relevant to the situation. What may be effective in combating crime is not likely to be effective in dealing with wrongdoers who in their own eyes, whether rightly or wrongly, think they are engaged in some noble cause. The Pentagon wants to kill them; the CIA wants to win them over.

Who's winning?

It's not a matter of winning, just different viewpoints. The president of the United States has got to say what is necessary to keep himself in office. We have a domestic foreign policy and a foreign foreign policy. The domestic foreign policy, which is the more important one, is what he has to do to make the American public think he's doing the right thing. Whether it's the right thing or not doesn't matter. The American people have to think he's doing the right thing because we have a democratic society. Now, the American people were highly indignant about what happened in Beirut [the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in June 1985]. They wanted to do something. They wanted to punish the people without regard to the consequences. The president had to say things to them, make threats, to show the American people that, by God, we were doing something. But the professionals inside the government were worried about the consequences of this. Because what it takes to please the American people is not what it takes to please a lot of people who did not grow up in the American culture but grew up in cultures quite different from our own. We've got most of the world against us at the moment. When we drag out our gunboats, bomb villages and kill a lot of women and children — a lot more than the terrorists kill — we turn the world against us. And the American people don't care. They don't give a damn. But those people whose job it is to look after the interests of the U.S. government abroad, they've got to care. They have to think of the consequences of everything we do. And they know the consequences of dragging out the gunboats are absolutely the wrong ones. In fact, these are the consequences the terrorists created acts of terrorism in order to provoke. That's the purpose of terrorism, not to kill, maim or destroy, but to terrify, to frighten, to anger, to provoke irrational responses. Terrorism gains more from the responses than it gains from the actions themselves.

So how do you deal with it?

You've got to know who they are. You've got to know their reasons for doing it. And you've got to manipulate them in one way or another. We have to somehow come to grips with the problem. The Israelis went in to Lebanon and killed tens of thousands of people. They say, "That's exaggerating, we didn't kill but 5000 people." Okay, let's say they killed only 2000 people, which is a very modest estimate. But they destroyed Lebanon. They then set up groups against each other, made chaos ten times worse than it already was. Instead of helping the Shites — the Shites welcomed the Israelis in — we, the United States, gave a billion dollars

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ON PAGE 19

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# SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AND DISINFORMATION:

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by

## OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT DENNIS KUX

Lately there has been increased public attention regarding Soviet "disinformation" and "active measures," attempts by Moscow to influence political attitudes and public opinion in non-communist countries through deceptive and often covert means.

Yet serious analysis has been limited. There has been a great deal of focus on Moscow's espionage endeavors, but this other facet of the Kremlin's intelligence operations has received far less scrutiny, either by the press or academics.

The terminology pertaining to the subject is unfamiliar and loosely defined, even among specialists. In fact, the terms "active measures" and "disinformation" are both imported directly from the Soviet intelligence lexicon. "Disinformation," the more frequently used and better-known term, is the English transliteration of the Russian "dezinformatsiya" or misinforming through the dissemination of information that is totally or partially false. The phrase "active measures" is the English translation of "aktivnyye meropriyatiya," the name of the Soviet KGB unit charged with implementing these activities.

In Soviet intelligence doctrine, the concept of "active measures" covers a wide span of practices including disinformation operations, political influence efforts, and the activities of Soviet front groups and foreign communist parties. All active measures have the common goal of enhancing Soviet influence, usually by tarnishing the image of opponents. They generally involve elements of deception and often employ clandestine means to mask Moscow's hand in the operation.

Overall, where active measures fit in the Soviet framework may be better understood by considering the whole spectrum of Soviet foreign policy endeavors through the optic of "white," "gray," and "black" operations. Normal diplomatic, trade, aid, and informational efforts can be considered

"white" or overt activities. "Gray" activities are those involving communist fronts, foreign communist parties, "clandestine" radio stations, or well-known media outlets for disinformation. While not officially acknowledged to be Soviet sponsored, semi-overt "gray" activities are widely known as under Soviet direction and control. In contrast, "black" activities involve genuinely clandestine operations: the use of agents of influence, spreading false rumors, duping politicians and journalists, and disseminating forgeries and fake documents. Active measures fall under either the "gray" or the "black" rubric, although the line between the semi-overt and the clandestine is often blurred.

Finding an appropriate English phrase to describe active measures is difficult. Former Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has written: "No phrase in English conveys precisely the meaning of active measures. Perhaps World War II psychological warfare operations provide the closest parallel."

## BACKGROUND

The Soviets first used active measures as a policy tool in the 1920s when Moscow sought to discredit emigre groups in Western Europe, particularly in France, by spreading disinformation and by luring emigre activists back to Russia through various subterfuges. Even before the 1917 Revolution, the Tsarist secret police employed similar deceptive techniques, using foreign agents not only to collect intelligence but also to sow dissent among emigre groups and, by covert subsidies to selected journals, to attempt to create a better foreign press for Imperial Russia.

In the 1950s the Soviet Union institutionalized these practices, establishing an intelligence unit that specialized in disinformation; this was Department D within the First Chief Directorate of the Soviet intelligence organization. In the 1960s, the term

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# "IDEAS MOVE NATIONS"

BY GREGG EASTERBROOK  
CSIS

**A**S RECENTLY AS 1950 LIONEL TRILLING COULD PROCLAIM, as if it were incontestable, that American conservatives had no ideas, only "irritable mental gestures." Today, though many conservatives remain irritable, ideas they possess in abundance. Conservative thinking has not only claimed the presidency; it has spread throughout our political and intellectual life and stands poised to become the dominant strain in American public policy. While the political ascent of conservatism has taken place in full public view, the intellectual transformation has for the most part occurred behind the scenes, in a network of think tanks whose efforts have been influential to an extent that only now, five years after President Reagan's election, begins to be clear.

Conservative think tanks and similar organizations have flourished since the mid-1970s. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) had twelve resident thinkers when Jimmy Carter was elected; today it has forty-five, and a total staff of nearly 150. The Heritage Foundation has sprung from nothing to command an annual budget of \$11 million. The budget of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has grown from \$975,000 ten years ago to \$8.6 million today. Over a somewhat longer period the endowment of the Hoover Institution has increased from \$2 million to \$70 million.

At least twenty-five other noteworthy public-policy groups have been formed or dramatically expanded through the decade; nearly all are anti-liberal. They include the Cato, Manhattan, Lehrman, Hudson, Shavano, Pacific, Sequoia, and Competitive Enterprise institutes; the committees on the Present Danger, for the Survival of a Free Congress, and for the Free World; the institutes for Foreign Policy Analysis, for Contemporary Studies, and for Humane Studies; the centers for Study of Public Choice, for the Study of American Business, and for Judicial Studies; the Political Economy Research Center; the Reason Foundation; the Washington, American, Capital, and Mountain States legal foundations; the Ethics and Public Policy Center; the National Center for Policy Analysis; the National Institute for Public Policy; and the Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy.

Today conservative commentators have their liberal counterparts outgunned by a wide margin. Conservative thinking has liberal thinking outgunned as well. In vigor, freshness, and appeal, market-oriented theories have surpassed government-oriented theories at nearly every turn. This feat has been accomplished in the main by circumventing the expected source of intellectual developments—the universities. Conservative thinkers have taken their case directly to Congress, the media, and the public—to the marketplace of ideas.

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**T**HE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL Studies, like Hoover at Stanford, is a conservative policy center attached to a generally liberal university (in this case, Georgetown). Unlike Hoover, CSIS is located well away from the parent campus: its offices on K Street, Washington's legal row, have the aspect of an investment-banking firm.

Perhaps because of its emphasis on international affairs, CSIS is the most aristocratic of the think tanks, and the most ceremonial. Big names abound. Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and James Schlesinger are "senior scholar-statesmen in residence." Other CSIS names are Thomas Moorer, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Ray Cline, a former deputy CIA director for intelligence; the authors Walter Laqueur and Michael Ledeen; the military analyst Edward Luttwak; and the economist Paul Craig Roberts. The most recent CSIS annual report resembles a social directory, listing a sixty-five person advisory board, a fourteen-person executive board, a twenty-seven-person international research council, staff, and a hundred scholars. The 1984 report listed 578 CSIS forum participants, plus more roundtables, symposia, and colloquia than any one person could ever attend. It also managed to drop Kissinger's name thirty-four times.

Because CSIS is heavy with people who would accept only top positions, it sent few into the Reagan Administration—Chester Crocker, the author of the Administration's "constructive engagement" policy toward South Africa, is its only prominent alumnus. Big names mean big overhead: Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Schlesinger have separate suites, perhaps to keep their ego fields from interacting. The big names are expected to "bring money with them" (to use the think-tank argot), raising a portion of the overhead from foundation contacts or on the cocktail-party circuit. A recent CSIS newsletter noted, "James Schlesinger . . . met with senior leadership of Texaco Inc. to discuss a number of defense and energy policy issues and to share a personal perspective on contemporary geopolitics."

Geopolitical perspectives are also shared at the annual shoulder-rubbing roundtables that CSIS holds in Washington, Dallas, Houston, and Miami (additional events in Los Angeles and Chicago are planned). Entrée to such occasions generally requires about a \$5,000 donation. The chief executive officers of large corporate donors received a "high-level CSIS briefing" in Washington for the second Reagan inauguration (whenever CEOs come to town, they expect important-sounding things to do), and CSIS stages